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1Introduction
Traditional real business cycle models (Kidland and Prescott 1982) assume that
technological change is the driving force behind growth and ﬂuctuations observed
in developed economies, in particular the U.S.. While these models have been
successful in accounting for a large fraction of the variability and comovements of the
aggregate time series, they do not do well along some dimensions. As is well known,
relative to the data, the variability of consumption, hours of work, and output is too
low, and the variability of investment is too high. But maybe the main failure is the
predicted correlation of real wages with both hours worked and output (the Dunlop-
Tarshis puzzle). In such a models, variations in technology shift the labor demand
curve but not the labor supply curve, thus inducing a strong positive correlation
between wages and hours. Similarly, the open economy versions of these models
(Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1994) appear to be insuﬃcient to account for key
features of the international business cycles. Namely, the international comovement
of investment and labor inputs, and the so-called consumption correlation puzzle
(according to which cross-country correlations of output are higher than the cross-
country correlations of consumption). Moreover, they have the same limitations
as their closed-economy counterpart regarding the dynamics of the real wage, the
labor productivity and the total hours.
The introduction of search and matching in the labor market (Andolfatto 1996)
outperforms the model predictions along several dimensions. Regarding the inter-
national ﬂuctuations, the combination of the search and matching hypothesis with
the non separability (between consumption and leisure) in the agents’ preferences
in a two-country framework (Hairault 2002), lets solve the consumption correlation
puzzle. On the other side, results from the search hypothesis suggest that to im-
prove the predictions from the real business cycle models, concerning the real wage
rigidity, one must include something that shifts labor supply. If both labor demand
and labor supply shift, then the strong positive correlation between hours and wages
can probably be reduced.
Several candidate labor supply shifters have already been considered, such as
home production (Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright 1991) or government consump-
2tion (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992). The inclusion of a public sector has the
potential to improve some of the predictions of the standard real business cycle
model. In particular, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) study a real business cycle
model in which government purchases aﬀect the agents’ utility. The expenditures
are ﬁnanced through lump-sum taxes. In this case, shocks to expenditures shift the
labor supply curve. However, they predict that while the hours and wage correlation
comes closer to that observed, it is signiﬁcantly positive. But they do not allow for
distortionary taxation.
Intuitively, like government expenditures, shocks to income and payroll taxes
can be interpreted as shocks to labor supply, as opposed to technology shocks which
may be interpreted as shocks to labor demand. Thus, taxes would provide an-
other mechanism for explaining the observed correlation between hours and wages.
On the empirical side, most studies assessing the eﬀects of tax shocks on the US
economy conclude that unanticipated tax increases have strong negative eﬀects on
output and other real economy variables. This is true for studies using the sign-
restrictions approach (Mountford and Uhlig 2005) or a narrative approach (Romer
and Romer 2007). Similarly, (Caldara and Kamps 2008) ﬁnd estimated eﬀects of
tax shocks ranging from non-distortionary to strongly distortionary, depending on
the identiﬁcation approach chosen. Moreover, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher
(2004) and McDaniel (2007) document large changes in the tax rates.
On the theoretical side, in the Keynesian tradition, ﬁscal policy, and therefore
taxation, is one of the main instruments to stabilize the economy. However, in the
1990s, several pioneering works considered taxation as a source of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. This feeds the criticisms about the possibility to use taxes as stabi-
lization tool. These former articles have shown that stochastic ﬁscal policy improves
the performance of real business cycle models. McGrattan (1994) ﬁnds that a signif-
icant portion of the variance of the aggregate consumption, output, hours worked,
capital stock, and investment can be attributed to the factor tax (i.e. on capital and
labor income) and government spending processes. Similarly, Braun (1994) shows
that modelling ﬂuctuations in personal and corporate income tax rates increases the
model’s predicted relative variability of hours and decreases its predicted correlation
between hours and average productivity. Finally, using Swedish data, Jonsson and
3Klein (1996) ﬁnd that the empirical ﬁt of a simple stochastic growth model is signif-
icantly improved when it is amended to include imperfectly predictable ﬂuctuations
in payroll taxes, consumption taxes and government consumption.1
In all cases, the basic mechanisms at work are as follows. Taxes to labor alter the
leisure/labor supply decision, highlighting the volatility of hours worked. In plain
words, if income and payroll taxes ﬂuctuate over time, it is optimal to work hard
when taxes are relatively low and to take time oﬀ when they are relatively high.
Then, as labor taxes ﬂuctuate, so do hours worked. Similarly, a temporarily high tax
rate on consumption provides an incentive to postpone consumption to a later date,
when the tax rate is likely to be lower. Hence, as the consumption tax ﬂuctuates, so
does consumption. Consequently, the inclusion of such a taxes should increase the
predicted volatility of hours and consumption, bringing the implications of theory
closer to the facts. Finally, the variability in investment and capital increases either
because of increases in the capital tax, or indirectly by the complementarity of
capital and labor, and even through the agents’ trade-oﬀ between consumption and
saving following a consumption tax shock.
In quantitative terms, these models yield to predictions for the correlation be-
tween hours and real wages, as measured by average productivity, close to the
empirical correlation. Likewise, the predicted variability of hours worked and con-
sumption are much closer to their empirical values when ﬁscal policy is included
(even if in general the relative volatility of aggregate hours is overstated). Never-
theless, these former papers show two drawbacks. The ﬁrst one is that all of them
consider a closed economy, so that the possible variability in the macro aggregates
passing through the international trade is not accounted for, whereas the interna-
tional facts are obviously left unexplained. The second one is that the theoretical
real wage is measured by average productivity, which prevents from analyzing other
features of the US labor market, such as the lower volatility of the real wage than
the one of the labor productivity.
Then, in this paper we develop an uniﬁed framework to show that ﬂuctuations
in distortive taxes can simultaneously account for most major puzzling features of
1Moreover, they ﬁnd that for large sets of conventional moments, models with stochastic ﬁscal policy
cannot be statistically rejected, whereas a model without it is always rejected.
4the U.S. business cycles. Namely, the observed real wage rigidity, the international
comovement of investment and labor inputs, and the so-called consumption corre-
lation puzzle. This is done in a two-country search and matching model with fairly
standard preferences, extended to include a tax/beneﬁt system. In this context, the
tax side is represented by average tax rates on labor income, employment (payroll
tax) and consumption, whereas the beneﬁt side is resumed by the unemployment
beneﬁts and the worker’s bargaining power.
The main departures from the former literature on taxation as a source of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations are twofold. First, we consider a two-country general equi-
librium model, so that we are able to discuss the eﬀects of shocks to taxes on the
observed international ﬂuctuations. Second, we assume search and matching in the
labor market. Our model is close to the Hairault (2002)’s one. However, in his
framework the non-separability of preferences, together with the variation in the
relative price of goods leads to slightly more procyclical real wages than with con-
ventional additively separable preferences. Our model is also close to the Ch´ eron
and Langot (2004)’s model, who explain the real wage rigidity in a closed-economy
search model by means of a particular set of non-separable preferences, which have
the property that, from an ex post perspective, employed agents are actually better
oﬀ than unemployed agents, and can take more advantage of an economic boom.
This depresses the outside options, in putting a downward pressure on the real wage.
Either in the Hairault (2002)’s paper or in the Ch´ eron and Langot (2004)’s paper,
the non-separability of preferences plays a main role. However, as was said before,
this hypothesis is unable to simultaneously account for the real wage rigidity and for
the observed international ﬂuctuations. Conversely, in this work we show that all
those facts can be accounted in a single framework with fairly standard preferences.
On the one side, an economic boom accompanied of a positive shock to the labor
taxes leads to countercyclical outside options, which dampens the procyclicality
of the real wage. On the other side, under the national specialization hypothesis,
the equalization of consumptions across countries following a productivity shock
does not hold anymore, (even in presence of separable preferences), and the gap
between domestic and foreign consumption increases as long as the consumption
tax is shocked too.
5The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the ﬁrst section we develop
the model. In the second section we explore the implications form the model under
several conﬁgurations. Last section gives the concluding remarks.
1 The Model
The world economy consists of two countries (country 1 or home country and country
2 or foreign country), each represented by a large number of identical consumers
and a production technology. Population size is normalized to unity. Each country
specializes in the production of a single good. The main source of ﬂuctuations are
persistent shocks to productivity that are internationally diﬀused. Additionally,
both countries are aﬀected by shocks to taxes on consumption and labor (i.e. ,
taxes on labor income and payroll taxes). The countries are linked either on the
consumption and the production side since agents demand a CES basket of the two
goods for consumption and investment purposes. Finally, agents participate in the
trade on the labor market.
1.1 Labor market ﬂows
Employment in country i = 1,2 is predetermined at each time and changes only
gradually as workers separate from jobs, at the exogenous rate si, or unemployed
agents ﬁnd jobs, at the endogenous hiring rate Mi,t. Let Ni,t and Vi,t, respectively
be the number of workers and the total number of new jobs made available by ﬁrms,
then employment evolves according to
Ni,t+1 = (1 − si)Ni,t + Mi,t, Mi,t = χV
φ
i,t[ei(1 − Ni,t)]1−φ, 0 < φ < 1, χ > 0.
In this expression ei > 0 is the constant search eﬀort and 0 < si < 1 the exogenous
separation rate of job-worker pairs.
1.2 Households
At any period, Ni agents are employed while the remaining 1−Ni are unemployed.
Unemployed agents are randomly matched with job vacancies. Employees work hi
6units of time at a wage rate of wi. Unemployed workers devote ei units of their time
seeking employment and receive the unemployment beneﬁts bi. In both cases they
pay a proportional labor income tax levied at rate τi
w. Markets are complete, so we
can derive the intertemporal decision rules by solving the program of a representative


















, for z = n,u, i = 1,2
CC,n and CC,u respectively stand for the consumption of employed and unemployed
agents. θ is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, and γ is the share
of the national good in the consumption basket. Consumption is subject to the
consumption tax rate τi









, for i = 1,2.
with Pi the production price of good i.
We assume perfect international risk sharing: households in the two countries
have access to contingent claims Bi,t = Bi(At) at prices vt = v(At+1) providing
one unit of good 1 if the state A occurs at t + 1. That is, we take the good
produced in country 1 as accounting unit, and we normalize its value to 1. Let
f(A) ≡ f(At+1,At) denote the density function describing the transition from the
state At to the state At+1. Then, the representative household in country i is
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subject to the labor constraint:
Ni,t+1 = (1 − s)Ni,t + Ψi,t(1 − Ni,t), for i=1,2 (2)
where Ψi,t ≡ Mi,t/(1 − Ni,t) is the rate at which unemployed agents ﬁnd jobs, and














vtB1,t+1dAt+1 ≤ B1,t + (3)
(1 − τ1














vtB2,t+1dAt+1 ≤ B2,t + (4)
(1 − τ1
w,t)pt[N2,tw2,th2,t + (1 − N2,t)b2,t] + L2,t, for i=2






P1,t and Li,t are
lump-sum transfers from the government to be deﬁned below.
The contemporaneous utility function is assumed to be increasing and concave
in its both arguments and exhibits conventional additive separability between con-
sumption (C
C,z













1−η with σ,η > 0 and Γu
i,t = Γu
i ∀t. The parameter σ can be
interpreted as reﬂecting diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of household’s home production
technology across diﬀerent states of employment opportunities.
1.3 Firms
Each country specializes in the production of a single good. The representative ﬁrm
in country i = 1,2 has a constant returns-to-scale technology that uses composite
capital and labor hours to produce output,
Yi,t = ai,tKα
i,t(Ni,thi,t)1−α, 0 < α < 1 (6)
The primary source of ﬂuctuations are persistent shocks to aggregate productivity,
represented by ai,t. The stochastic productivity vector at = [a1,t,a2,t]′ is assumed
to follow a V AR(1) process in natural logarithms:
lnat+1 = Ωlnat + ϑǫt+1 , where ǫt+1 ∼ iid N(0,I)
The vector ǫt = [ǫ1,ǫ2]′ represents the innovations to productivity variables. The







describes the autoregressive component of the disturbance. Finally, the covariances







This matrix reﬂects the extent to which the shocks are idiosyncratic or global in
nature.
8New capital goods are internationally mobile. Investment Ic
i,t has the same CES






Let ωi be the unitary cost of a vacancy job. Firms seek to maximize the dis-








for πi,t = Pi,t
 





subject to the constraints,
Ni,t+1 = (1 − si)Ni,t + Φi,tVi,t (8)
Ki,t+1 = (1 − δ)Ki,t + Ii,t (9)
and given some initial conditions (Ni,0,Ki,0), where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation
rate of capital. Φi,t ≡ Mi,t/Vi,t is the rate at which vacancies and workers are
matched and τi
f stands for the country-speciﬁc payroll tax payed by ﬁrms.
1.4 Government
The government levies taxes to ﬁnance expenditures. We assume a balanced budget
at each period, so that any revenue that is not used to ﬁnance current purchases is
transferred to households in a lump-sum payment. Thus, real transfers to country























In order to be coherent with our estimations (appendix A), we assume that the
stochastic process governing tax rate τj, for j = c,w,f, follows an AR(1) process in
9natural logarithms,
log(τj,t+1) = (1 − ρj)log ¯ τj + ρj log(τj,t) + ǫj,t+1, with ǫj,t ∼ N(0,σj) (12)
with ¯ τj denoting the mean value of the tax variable τj,t, for j = c,w,f.
1.5 Nash bargaining
Wages and hours worked are derived from the generalized Nash-bargaining model















marginal value of a match for a worker, and λi,t be the shadow price of the budget
constraint.
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stands for the tax wedge in this economy.
And the three following equivalent expressions for the wages contracts3









σ(1 − h2,t)−η (16)
Note that in this case the hours contracts are aﬀected by the relative price of goods p.
3Similarly, for the foreign country (i = 2) we have:
(1 + τ2


















Note that in this case the outside options are aﬀected by the relative price of goods p.
10Labor cost
(1 + τ1
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where, for i = 1,2 the search costs SC are deﬁned by:
SCi,t = ωi

    
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(20)
where SCi denotes the average search and matching costs per hiring incurred by
ﬁrms.
As in the standard search framework, the wage bill turns to be some weighted
average of (i) the worker’s contribution to output plus the average costs per hiring,
and (ii) the worker’s endogenous outside options. Nonetheless, this time the search
costs are aﬀected by the dynamics of the labor tax rates. Likewise, the income and
intertemporal eﬀects that shape the outside opportunities (through variations in λi,t)
depend not only on variations in the relative price of goods, but also on variations
in the consumption tax. All this together could potentially lead to counter-cyclical
wage dynamics, converse to the standard setting.
11The impact of taxes on the labor supply
The impact of taxes on the number of hours worked and on wages is as follows:
• Hours worked and taxes. Equation (17) shows that the marginal produc-
tivity net of the labor taxes (payroll tax and labor income tax) is equal to
the marginal disutility of labor. The introduction of these two taxes reduces
the labor supply as households prefer leisure, because this good is not taxed.
Moreover, the tax on consumption also decreases the number of hours worked
because it increases the cost of consumption and then reduce the incentives to
work.
• Bargained wage and taxes. In the bargaining process, either the ﬁrm or the
worker try to incorporate their own tax burden in the wage (the payroll tax for
the ﬁrm, and the labor income tax and the consumption tax for the worker).
The three equations in (19) show that following a labor tax increase (τw or τf),
the fraction of the bargained surplus distributed to the workers decreases. This
clearly reduces the net wage, diminishing the labor supply. The gross wage
equation provides another way to interpret the impact of the labor taxes on
the labor supply: an increase of the payroll tax decreases the bargained surplus
distributed to the workers, by decreasing the workers bargained power, whereas
an increase of the labor income tax acts as an increase of the bargaining power
of the ﬁrms. The consumption tax has an impact on wages through the higher
cost of consumption, leading to a higher value of the outside options. This
also reduces the labor supply.
• Search costs and taxes. Converse to the standard setting, the search costs
take into account the intertemporal substitution of labor. If, for instance, the
labor income tax increases tomorrow (τi
w,t+1 > τi
w,t), the ﬁrm anticipates a
higher bargaining power than today: the term b in equation (20) increases.
This would increase the value of keeping an insider (the probability of keeping
a job is 1 − si and the search costs saved in that case amounts to ωi/Φi,t).
At the opposite, this would reduce the value of hiring today an outsider: the
term a in equation (20) decreases. Likewise, if τi
f,t+1 > τi
f,t the term a will
increase, whereas the term term b will decrease. In this case the intuition is
12that insiders have lower salary vindication today because they anticipate a fall
in their purchasing power tomorrow. Conversely, the outsiders accept lower
wages today because they anticipate that their outside options will be lower
tomorrow (remember that the income of unemployed workers is also taxed).
Since in both cases the insiders eﬀect and the outsiders eﬀect oﬀset each other,
the total outcome on the search costs is ambiguous.
1.6 Equilibrium
The optimal households’ choices of contingent bonds lead to: vt = β
λi,t+1
λi,t f(A).
Under the assumption that all households have the same initial wealth distribution,
we deduce that λ1,t = λ2,t = λt. Then, the search equilibrium in country i = 1,2 is
characterized by the following system of equations:
Ni,t+1 = (1 − si)Ni,t + V
φ




i,t)−1 = λt (22)
The equalization of consumptions across countries following an idiosyncratic shock
does not hold anymore even in presence of separable preferences. This is due to
the change in the relative price of goods. In addition, in the present case the
















The intertemporal allocation of consumption and leisure is such that the marginal
contribution of one hour of labor for the ﬁrm is equal to the marginal cost of one
worked hour for the worker. Remark that in the foreign country the number of
















































13These expressions for the wage contracts are obtained by assuming that, at equi-
librium, the unemployment beneﬁts b amount to a fraction ρ of the wage bill, with
ρ given by the average replacement rate: bi,t = ρi,twi,thi,t. With this we can now
now complete the analyze of the eﬀects on the wage bill of the tax/beneﬁt system:
higher replacement rates imply unemployment beneﬁt, which yields to higher wages
because they now must compensate the higher outside options of the worker.

































1,t + ˆ φ(IC
1,t − δK1,t), q2,t ≡ Pc
2,t + ptˆ φ(IC
























The ﬁrm optimal choices of employment (equations (25) and (26)) are very similar
to those of capital (equations (27) and (28)) because ﬁnding new workers takes time
and eﬀort, so that the existing labor force is viewed by the ﬁrm as an capital asset.
Nonetheless, the ﬁrm’s tends to reduce the number of vacancies as the payroll tax
increases. Moreover, either the capital or the employment decisions are aﬀected by
the consumption tax trough λt.
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Ci
j,t, Ii
j,t respectively denote the demands for good j from country (i = 1,2, j = 1,2)










Ki,t+1 = (1 − δ)Ki,t + Ic
i,t (33)
2 Empirical results
As we aim to shed new light on old debates, for numerous parameters, as well
as for the stylized facts, we use standard values. The most are taken from the
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994)’ and Andolfatto (1996)’ works. We also adopt
a symmetric calibration of the two countries with a null net exports steady state.
This facilitates the comparison of our results with a bulk of previous literature
on international ﬂuctuations. For the additional parameters, in particular those
regarding taxes, the calibration procedure is quite traditional. However, matter of
consistency, estimations and average values are based on the 1970:1-1986:4 period,
as in Backus et al.(1994).
2.1 Parameterization
The technology parameters are calibrated as follows (Backus et al.(1994)). The
autocorrelation parameter ρ1,1 = ρ2,2 = ρ is set at 0.906. The cross-country diﬀusion
parameter ρ1,2 = ρ2,1 = ρ∗ is ﬁxed at 0.088 and υ1,2 = υ2,1 = υ is calibrated in order
to get a correlation between technology innovations of 0.258. The depreciation rate
δ is set at 0.025. α, which no longer corresponds to the labor share of output, is
calibrated in order to get a labor share of 64%. And the discount factor β is set at
0.99.
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, θ, is set at
1.2, while the value of the home bias γ is set at 0.75. The capital adjustment cost
15parameter, ˆ φ is calibrated in order to replicate the volatility of investment in each
model conﬁguration.
For the labor-market parameters, the calibration is symmetric across countries
and rely mostly on Andolfatto (1996). The elasticity of the matching function with
respect to vacancies and the ﬁrm’s bargaining power are set to ǫ = ψ = 0.6. The
value of χ is chosen to be consistent with the stationary values (in the non-taxation
economy) for the probability that a vacancy position becomes a productive job,
the employment ratio and the fraction of time spent working: Φ = 0.9, N = 0.57
and h = 1/3. The ratio of aggregate recruiting expenditures to output is ﬁxed
at ωV ∗/Y ∗ = 1%, and the average fraction of time that nonemployed households
devote to search to e = h∗/2. Following Hairault (2002), we choose η = 5 and
the quarterly rate of transition from employment to non-employment equal to s =
0.10. Lastly, parameters σ and Γu are computed to be consistent with steady-state
restrictions.
The last set of values concerns the evolution of the tax rates. We take as bench-
mark the US estimates to be found in table 3 (appendix A).
The equilibrium can now be computed numerically.
2.2 Models evaluation
The equilibrium decision rules are used to simulate the time paths for the variables
of interest. The statistical properties of these simulated time series are then com-
pared to the statistics summarizing the cyclical properties of the US and the model
economies. Statistics are reported in Table 1. Models include our tax/beneﬁt,
international search model with standard separable preferences under four conﬁg-
urations: (i) ﬂuctuations are only driven by productivity shocks (LMS1), (ii) ﬂuc-
tuations are driven as well by consumption tax shocks (LMS2), (iii) ﬂuctuations
are also driven by labor income tax shocks (LMS3), and (iv) ﬂuctuations are also
driven by payroll tax shocks (LMS4). That is, in last model ﬂuctuations are driven
by simultaneous shocks to technology and to all tax rates. In explaining the in-
stantaneous responses of variables, we shall focus primarily on the home economy
(country 1).
16Table 1: Cyclical properties
Data LMS1 LMS2 LMS3 LMS4
shock to: a a,τc a,τc,τw a,τc,τw,τf
φ = .165 φ = .175 φ = 0.21 φ = 1.63
Internationala,e
ρ(Y1,Y2) 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
ρ(C1,C2) 0.40 0.95 0.46 0.48 0.49
ρ(H1,H2) 0.36 0.63 0.69 0.68 0.69
ρ(I1,I2) 0.38 -0.16 -0.08 0.06 0.12
USAc,e
σY (in %) 1.91 1.30 1.27 1.51 1.54
σC/σY 0.40 0.45 0.62 0.56 0.55
σH/σY 0.86 0.36 0.40 0.90 0.93
σI/σY 3.07 3.06 3.07 3.05 3.05
σLP/σY 0.57 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.67
σW/σY 0.45 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.71
ρ(Yt,Yt−1) 0.85 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.78
ρ(Ct,Ct−1) 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.74
ρ(Ht,Ht−1) 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.85
ρ(It,It−1) 0.81 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.74
ρ(LPt,LPt−1) 0.52 0.60 0.60 0.64 0.64
ρ(Y,C) 0.83 0.98 0.76 0.79 0.80
ρ(Y,H) 0.82 0.89 0.81 0.75 0.76
ρ(Y,I) 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.96
ρ(Y,LP) 0.51 0.97 0.94 0.47 0.43
ρ(Y,W) 0.28 0.99 0.95 0.37 0.33
ρ(H,LP) -0.07 0.76 0.57 -0.21 -0.24
ρ(H,W) 0.03 0.81 0.60 -0.28 -0.28
The moments reported are computed from Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered artiﬁcial time series. a
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995). b Hairault (2002). c Ch´ eron and Langot (2004). d
Baxter and Crucini (1993). e Hairault (1995). 17Only technological shocks (LMS1).
Responses to productivity shock to country 1 are displayed in ﬁgure 1. On the
demand side, the trade in the labor market, together with the international diﬀu-
sion of technological shocks, makes ﬁrms of two countries start posting vacancies
simultaneously. Then total hours rise slowly in the two countries. Since capital
productivity increases, so do investment in both countries at impact. On the sup-
ply side, the wealth eﬀects in the household’s labor decisions is reduced by the
deterioration of both the exchange rate and the terms of trade of country 1: E
and p increase, as showed in the top left panel of ﬁgure 5. This leads to a slight
dissociation of national consumption from foreign consumption.




































































































Country 1 receives a positive 1% shock to productivity (ρ12 = ψ = 0).
Let us turn now to the analysis of the eﬀects from shocks only to taxes. This is
useful to understand the aggregate eﬀect of simultaneous (positive) shocks to both
18productivity and taxes.
Consumption tax shock (LMS2).
An increase in the consumption tax reduces the demand for consumption. A
temporarily high tax rate on consumption provides an incentive to postpone con-
sumption to a later date, when the tax rate is likely to be lower. Hence, as the
consumption tax ﬂuctuates, so does consumption. Furthermore, because such a tax
lowers the purchasing power of an hour worked, it also reduces the labor supply.
The increase in saving raises the agent’s wealth and then her outside option.
This reduces the incentives to post vacancies. Remark that converse to what one
may expect from the analysis of the wage equation, the consumption tax shock
largely dampens the search costs. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the outside options
through the decrease in λ (ﬁgure 2) dominate, so that the real wage rate responds
positively in the two countries. This reduces too the incentives to post vacancies.
Aggregate hours of work go down in both countries, bringing output down below
trend. This explains the positive international correlation of labor input.
Then, an additional positive shock to consumption tax in country 1 diminishes
the cross-country correlation of consumption, so that it is even lower than the cross-
correlation of outputs. This also enhances both, the volatility and the procyclicality
of consumption. Looking at the IRF in ﬁgure 2 we see that, since the consumption
tax encourages saving, this motivates the accumulation of capital, producing a pos-
itive response of investment in the ﬁrst periods, which allows for a slightly positive
response of output few periods later. Thereafter the economy slowly goes back to
the steady state. This increases the predicted volatility of hours and consumption,
bringing the implications of theory closer to the facts.
Labor income tax shocks (LMS3).
A positive 1% shock to country 1 labor income tax leads to a non-negative
international correlation of consumptions, and to a higher volatility of aggregate
hours, that now is very close to data. But the striking eﬀect is the reduction of the
correlation of real wage with both output and labor input. The IRF functions to a
positive orthogonal 1% shock to labor income tax are plotted in ﬁgure 3. This shock
produces a large response in aggregate hours, which falls about 1%. This is due to





























































































Country 1 receives a positive 1% shock to consumption tax.
20the deeper rise in the real wage. Indeed, the direct impact of the labor income tax on
wages is larger than the indirect adjustments of productivity and wealth: the labor
income tax increases the real wage through the bargaining process. This higher
tax also decreases labor input, implying higher productivity and lower reservation
wage, due to the lower agent’s wealth (λ increases). Then, we observe a sharper fall
in vacancies and in the search costs than with a consumption tax shock. Basically,
the leisure/labor supply decision is aﬀected by an instantaneous substitution eﬀect
which induces households to reduce current consumption and work eﬀort. The fall
in aggregate hours, in turn, raises the average productivity in the early periods.
Finally, the larger instantaneous response of the hourly wage is also explained
by the stronger eﬀect on the outside options due to the fall in the relative prices of
goods (p and E, ﬁgure 5), which oﬀsets in part the increase in wealth (the fall in
λ).

































































































Country 1 receives a positive 1% shock to labor income tax.
21Payroll tax shocks: all shocks at work (LMS4).
The eﬀects of a positive shock to payroll tax in country 1 are plotted in ﬁgure 4.
Apart from the real wage, the instantaneous responses of variables are qualitatively
similar to those produced by the shock to the labor income tax. However, this
additional shock produces higher volatility of hours, as well as higher international
correlation of labor inputs. But now the international correlation of investment is
positive and the correlation of real wage with output decreases by more.
Converse to the previous scenario, the instantaneous response of the real wage
to the payroll tax shock is negative in country 1. This shows that part of the tax
burden of ﬁrms is supported by workers. The lower purchasing power of an hour
worked implies a fall in both consumption and saving (investment). But even if the
gross wage decreases, the labor cost increases. This explains the fall in aggregate
hours. From the employment equation (equations (25 and 26) we see the direct
negative eﬀect of the higher payroll tax on the ﬁrm’s employment decision. This
adds to the larger fall in vacancies and in the search costs. With the retained
calibration, all this reduces the real wage in country 1.
Furthermore, the volatility of aggregate hours is enhanced. In plain words, if
income and payroll taxes ﬂuctuate over time, it is optimal to work hard when taxes
are relatively low and to take time oﬀ when they are relatively high. Then, as labor
taxes ﬂuctuate, so do hours worked.
To sum up, by adding the eﬀects of all four shocks we better understand the
quantitative implications of our economy. In this case the model reproduces quite
well the facts regarding the international comovements: the international correlation
of consumption is reduced, whereas the cross-country correlation of labor input,
as well as that of investment is now positive, converse to the model with only
technological shocks.
Concerning the labor market dynamics, the introduction of ﬁscal shocks allows to
a signiﬁcant reduction in the correlation of wages with both output and aggregate
hours. The model also match the relative volatility of real wages. However, the
relative standard deviation of hours is slightly overstated. Nevertheless, results are
encouraging.





























































































Country 1 receives a positive 1% shock to payroll tax.
233 Conclusion
In this paper the eﬀects of distortionary taxation are studied in the context of a
two-country general equilibrium model with search and matching on the labor mar-
ket. We show that distortive taxes on labor and consumption have important eﬀects
on the quantitative properties of the model, allowing to outperform the predictions
from the model without taxation in several lines. In particular, we show that the
ﬂuctuations in distortive taxes provide a plausive explanation from the three empir-
ical puzzles concerning the real wage dynamics and the international ﬂuctuations.
Moreover, our framework reconciliate the standard separable preferences with
either the observed U.S. real wage rigidity and the international ﬂuctuations, by
taking into account the tax/benefyt system. This provides simultaneously an ex-
planation to the real wage rigidity puzzle, alternative to that of Ch´ eron and Langot
(2004); and an explanation to the quantities puzzle (concerning the ranking of the
outputs correlation relative to the consumptions correlation), alternative to the
Hairault (2002)’s one. In the two cases, the authors base their explanations on the
non-separability of agents’ preferences between consumption and leisure. However,
this hypothesis is unable to simultaneously account for the real wage rigidity and
for the observed international ﬂuctuations.
Nevertheless, the problem of modelling income taxes has not been resolved in
a fully satisfactory way. The volatility of labor input is exaggerated, whereas the
persistence of output and the other macro aggregates is underestimated. Despite our
model’s shortcomings, it is striking how much we are able to explain by amending
a basic two-country search model with fairly standard preferences to include ﬁscal
policy variables.
24Figure 5: IRF - Relative prices






















































IRF of the relative prices of goods E and p to the several shocks. a: tax/beneﬁt economy
when country 1 receives a positive 1% shock to productivity (ρ12 = ψ = 0).
25A Tax rates
As in Ohanian et al.(2006), we use the series, comparable across countries and time,
of average tax rates on consumption and labor income provided by McDaniel (2007).
These series are deduced from the national accounts statistics and the method is the
same as in Mendoza et al.(1994). The method is also close to the one in Prescott
(2004). However, Prescott makes an adjustment to account for a progressive tax
system and no such adjustments are made by McDaniel. Lastly, the payroll taxes
are deduced deduced from the ratio of the compensation of employees (CoE) to the
wage and salaries (WS). All these taxes should then be interpreted as average, not
marginal. The estimated processes for taxes are showed in table 3.
However, in dealing with taxation, it is important to distinguish the average tax
rate from the marginal tax rate. Whereas the average rate is an indicator of the
global volume of taxation, the marginal rate, which measures the increase in taxation
on each extra unit of income or expenditure, is an indicator of the progressivity of
taxes. In progressive systems of mandatory contributions the marginal rate exceeds
the average rate.
Some authors, such as Joines (1981) or McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997)
calculate average marginal labor income tax rates in the US utilizing data (from
the Statistics Income published by the Internal Revenue Service) that allow the
authors to classify income taxes paid by adjusted gross income. McDaniel makes a
comparison of her average taxes with these marginal taxes and concludes that both
series display similar trends, but the average rates are slightly below the marginal
rates, evidencing some progressivity.
Similarly, Cahuc and Zylberbeg (2004) present ﬁgures for 1990 (see table 2)
for the average rate, the marginal rate, and the coeﬃcient ηe of residual income
progression as they apply to taxation on the income of a single person with an
income equivalent to 167% of that of an average worker in 1999 from some OECD
countries. A unitary coeﬃcient means that average taxes are equal to marginal
taxes (no progressive system), whereas a coeﬃcient lower (resp. higher) than unity
corresponds to a progressive (resp. regressive) system. Note that France and the
UK have marginal rates clearly lower than those of the other countries, and the
26gap between the average rate and the marginal rate is also relatively narrow there,
which is a sing that they are less progressive. But in all countries the coeﬃcient
of residual income progression is lower but not far from unity, so that our search
model with average taxes is a good approximation.
Table 2: Average rates and marginal rates for a single person with an income equivalent
to 167% of that of an average worker in 1999.
Country Average Rate Marginal rate ηe
Denmark 51.6 63.3 0.76
France 31.0 35.4 0.93
Germany 47.5 58.5 0.79
Japan 19.3 30.8 0.85
Netherlands 39.1 50.0 0.82
Sweden 40.3 50.6 0.83
United Kingdom 26.6 33.0 0.91
Unites States 31.9 42.9 0.84
Source: Cahuc and Zylberbeg (2004), table 12.8, pp. 756. (Original source: OECD (2001), Taxing
Wages: Income Tax, Social Security contributions and Cash Family Beneﬁts, 1999-2000, Paris: OECD).
Moreover, as Piketty and Saez (2006) show, the progressivity has declined sub-
stantially since 1970 in the countries with available data: France, United States and
United Kingdom. The last argument to justify the use of average taxes in our search
economy concerns data availability: as all these authors point out, producing data
on progressive taxes is very diﬃcult and costly.
A.1 Exogeneity of taxes
Here we test the Granger causality of each tax process and the Solow residual. The
steps followed for this exercise are the following:
1. We compute the TFP according to the Cobb-Douglas technology.
2. We compute the residuals from the regression of the logarithm of the TFP on
a linear tendency and a constant. These residuals are our Solow residual SR.






j 0.083 0.207 0.197
ρi
j 0.920 0.928 0.820
σi
j 0.041 0.040 0.031
R2 0.818 0.938 0.583
OLS estimations.
















Lecture: The solow residual Granger-causes the labor income tax rate at 93% conﬁdence
level.
3. Finally, we estimate a VAR(1) of the logarithm of each tax series and the
Solow residuals to test the Granger causality.
Table 4 reports the marginal probabilities p associated with the Granger-causality
test. The columns reﬂect the Granger-causal impact of the column-variable on the
row variable. Inferences are drown on the basis of a (1−p)×100% conﬁdence level.
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